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ABSTRACT
The hostile media effect refers to individuals’ tendencies to perceive seemingly neutral
news coverage as biased against their stance (Vallone et al., 1985). Research has shown
this effect in partisan politics, with liberals and conservatives perceiving bias in
information presented from the opposing side. The current study examined the effects of
liberal or conservative and small or large audience news source manipulations on
liberals’ and conservatives’ perceptions of media bias and the relationship between
partisan identity and perceptions of bias. Three hundred and sixty participants read a
news article presented with either a Fox News, CNN, PatriotNewsDaily, or The
Progressive news heading and completed a questionnaire assessing perceptions of article
bias, article quality, and their agreement with the article’s content. I hypothesized that
liberals and conservatives would perceive hostile media bias when reading an article with
an opposing source heading and that the effect would be greater when participants were
presented with the high-reach source headings (i.e., Fox News, CNN). Liberals and
conservatives did not perceive the article to be biased against their stance based on the
political stance of the news source or its perceived reach. They also did not differ in their
article quality ratings and ratings of agreement with the article’s content depending on the
news source or perceived reach. Exploratory correlations between partisan identity article
bias, article quality, and agreement with the article’s content showed small correlations
overall. Individuals may be less inclined to focus as much on the source of information in
a society increasingly centered on sharing of content on social media. They also may
focus less on a source’s political stance and more on the article content itself. This

research highlights the effects of the way news outlets present their content as well as an
individual’s biased interpretations of the news they are receiving.
Keywords: hostile media effect, liberal, conservative, psychology, study
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Effects of Reach and Partisan Identity on the Hostile Media Effect
Since 1994, the divide between individuals who identify as Democrat and
individuals who identify as Republican on major political issues has more than doubled
(Doherty, 2017). There are several aspects of news media directly tied to this widening
partisan divide, including the biased presentation of media coverage on political issues.
This biased news presentation has coincided with the proliferation of coverage as a result
of the 24-hour news cycle and the growth of mainstream cable news networks. News
media, especially cable television, that has a liberal slant may amplify viewpoints of
other liberals, creating an “echo chamber” effect (Carmichael et al., 2017). This biased
news coverage encourages supporters of a partisan position to operate in a closed system
where they only believe arguments on their side to be true, and their overall viewpoints
are strengthened.
This growing divide between the positions of Democrats and Republicans on
major issues contributes to greater feelings of negativity towards the opposing party.
Identified as affective polarization, this is a growing trend of animosity between the two
parties where individuals on both sides feel negatively towards the other and perceive
them as unwilling to cooperate across political lines (Iyengar et al., 2018). Startlingly, the
U.S. has increased in affective polarization significantly more than eight other major
countries studied for this phenomenon, including the U.K., Canada, German, and
Australia (Boxell et al., 2021). With feelings towards members of the opposing party
growing increasingly negative, it is important to examine what contributes to this effect.
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The political slant of news coverage has played a significant role in this growing
rift between liberals and conservatives, and it occurs through the strategic ways news
networks present their coverage. All three major cable news networks (i.e., FOX News,
CNN, MSNBC) engaged in several noteworthy bias tactics in their coverage of the 2012
election (Rosell, 2013). Programs were biased in many ways, including their story
selections, their deliberate omissions of other sides of a story, and their strategic selection
of guests who offered supportive points to their overall agenda. Other networks have also
displayed partisan bias in their coverage, with CBS stories favoring the Democratic
candidate in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections and ABC stories favoring the
Republican candidate (Zeldes et al., 2008). News coverage with a political slant has
played a role in the growing divide between Democrats and Republicans, but individual
perceptions of bias also play a role, even when the news coverage is largely unbiased.
Partisan evaluations are not only affected by the presentation of news coverage,
but also the individual interpretations and perceptions of this coverage. Even unbiased
news can be perceived to be biased by people if it goes against their personal beliefs or
worldview. The hostile media effect refers to an individual’s tendency to perceive even
objective news coverage of a particular issue as biased against their stance (Vallone et al.,
1985). Democrats are likelier to perceive a Republican bias in mainstream media,
whereas Republicans are likelier to perceive a Democratic bias, regardless of the
objectivity of the news reported (Morris, 2007). Individuals on both sides of a debate
have a stake in the outcome, and – because of their stance – may interpret news coverage
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in a biased way, despite the accuracy of the information reported. Personal values and
beliefs may impact an individual’s perceptions of bias, even in unbiased news coverage.
This study examined the hostile media effect in online news coverage. In the
following sections, I first discuss what “neutral” or non-biased media consists of. Then, I
review the foundations of the hostile media effect, including hostile media effect research
as well as several components of motivated reasoning, including cognitive dissonance
and confirmation bias. Then, I discuss the effects of news source heading manipulations,
the strength of an individual’s identification with their partisan position, and the
perceived influence of the news source on hostile media bias in individuals. Finally, I
describe a study that assessed perceived hostile media bias and its relationship with these
components.
Neutrality and Bias in News Media
When news reporting was establishing its footing as a more desirable profession
in the 1800s, realism and unbiased reporting was widespread (Gershon, 2019). The most
successful journalists were those whose work was entirely based on factual reporting
(Gershon, 2019). The turn of the 20th century saw a shift, where reporters became more
aware of the effects of propaganda. With this, news reporting with a slant, or an
allegiance to a certain side, became more mainstream. Walter Lippmann, one of the most
prominent journalists of the 20th century, described the dangers that biased news reporting
causes for democracy and stated that journalism should find a common ground rooted in
facts (Lippmann et al., 1920). Despite Lippmann’s influential commentary, journalistic
objectivity continues to be a topic of concern. There is no clear agreement between
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liberals and conservatives on what news “falls in the middle” between the two sides. In
fact, 56% of Americans stated that they cannot name a news source that reports news
objectively (Jones & Ritter, 2018).
In a world where perceptions of a hostile media are increasingly apparent, some
journalists have become more conscientious in their objective reporting of the news
(Solomon, 2018). They recognize neutral and fair reporting of the news as being a core
value the profession of journalism was built on. However, there seems to be a tradeoff
between objective reporting of the news and producing informative content. For example,
reporting news in partisan politics that is objective, or covers both the liberal and
conservative sides in an equal manner, can actually be counterproductive. Reporting news
in partisan politics in an objective manner that does not question either side may actually
undermine the public’s ability to make an informed decision and their ability to make
significant distinctions between two candidates (Dunaway et al., 2015; Patterson, 2013).
In fact, articles with no slant that did not pick a side in a debate were found to be less
informative as a whole (Dunaway et al., 2015).
Media bias refers to the subjectivity of journalists and all those who report the
news in the ways they select and cover events. Biased reporting is accomplished through
the process of framing, which refers to selecting elements of a perceived or implied
reality and organizing them in a narrative to achieve a desired interpretation of the story
(Entman, 2007). Creating a narrative that promotes a particular interpretation of a story
has often been referred to in media bias research as agenda setting (Entman, 2007;
Morstatter et al., 2018). News reporters who bias their coverage want their audience to
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respond to information in a particular way, and framing allows them to achieve this goal.
The concept of slant goes hand in hand with framing, and the overall concept of media
bias, as it indicates an allegiance to a particular side. Slant is often achieved through the
particular language used in a story as well as the elements of a story that are included
(Dunaway et al., 2015). In the political landscape, slant is interpreted through the ways
policy and various others pieces of information, such as candidate trait and issue
preferences, are discussed in a story. Skeptics have been aware of biased reporting for
more than a century, but it has only been recently that researchers have begun to examine
the mechanisms through which it is achieved.
Foundations of the Hostile Media Effect
Hostile Media Effect Review
The hostile media effect refers to how even neutral news information can be
perceived as biased against one’s stance (Vallone et al., 1985). This effect has been
demonstrated in perceptions of news coverage related to areas such as sports (Arpan &
Raney, 2003), the use of GMOs (Gunther et al., 2009), various political issues (Gunther
& Liebhart, 2006), and the 1997 UPS strike (Christen et al., 2002). For example, in
viewing the same news story about the Beirut massacre of 1982 from a major TV
network, pro-Israeli students and pro-Arab students perceived the coverage to be biased
against their side (Vallone et al., 1985). A meta-analysis on hostile media effect research
showed a medium effect size across all thirty-four of the studies (Hansen & Kim, 2011).
This meta-analysis investigated the various mediums through which the hostile media
effect was explored, finding 50% of the studies examined the effect through newspaper
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content, whereas the rest examined the effect through television or general media
exposure.
The hostile media effect has been studied extensively in political communication.
In a study of reactions to the John Kerry/George W. Bush debates preceding the 2004
Presidential election, Republicans were more likely to perceive the moderator of the
debate to be hostile against George W. Bush, whereas Democrats were more likely to
perceive the moderator to be hostile against John Kerry (Richardson et al., 2008).
Individuals perceive less bias against their position in news coverage if the host of a show
has similar political views, and more bias against their position when they do not
(Feldman, 2011). Although Democrats and Republicans differ on their opinions, values,
and beliefs, it appears hostile media bias affects supporters of both political parties.
Perceptions of bias in political news coverage cover a wide range of political
issues. An individual’s partisan stance impacts their perception of global warming, and
they may perceive opposing coverage as biased against their stance (Feldman et al.,
2017). Democrats and Republicans also perceived media bias in newspapers they read
during a gubernatorial race (Huge & Glynn, 2010). Interestingly, Republicans’
perceptions of bias grew much stronger as the campaign wore on as opposed to
Democrats’ perceptions. This finding could be attributed to the fact the Democratic
candidate had an increasingly larger lead in opinion polls as the election drew closer, so
the Democrats may have been less apprehensive about biased coverage swaying voters
who were unsure of their candidate choice (Huge & Glynn, 2010). These results indicate
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that individual perceptions of bias may be fluid throughout an election cycle depending
on factors such as opinion polls.
As the social media age has progressed, the hostile media effect research has
translated to online settings. One of these settings is the social media platform Twitter,
which is a major media source for consumers of news. Individuals who identified as
Democrat perceived hostile media bias in a tweet from another Twitter user who
identified as Republican (Lee et al., 2018). News articles that are embedded in shared
posts on social media also seem to induce biased perceptions. Liberals and conservatives
perceived bias in a news article included in a blog post when it was presented from a
source with the opposing political position (Yun et al., 2016). This bias may emerge even
if individuals do not read the article. Partisans perceived bias in a Facebook post about an
article when they were exposed to comments underneath it that disagreed with their
stance (Gearhart et al., 2020). There were no biased perceptions in partisans who were
exposed to comments that agreed with their opinions. Even in an online setting such as
social media, partisans demonstrate hostile media perceptions, and these could be
influenced by perceptions of the source and comments on the social media posts.
Theory and Processes
The hostile media effect is a subset of a larger area of research in social cognition,
called motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning refers to how individuals are driven to
be accurate in their thoughts and behavior, and this process influences the way they
construct and access their internal beliefs (Kunda, 1990). Other aspects of motivated
reasoning include cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias, and selective exposure. These
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terms compose the foundation of the hostile media effect and the mechanisms that
contribute to perceptions of media bias.
Motivated Reasoning
Individuals’ behaviors are heavily impacted by internal beliefs they hold to be true
and their motivations to adhere to these beliefs. The motivation to defend one’s beliefs is
manifested in the way people make decisions and develop or change their attitudes. This
idea has been applied to explain people’s behavior in a variety of ways, with one example
being the use of stereotypes (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999). When individuals believe a
stereotype fits the initial impression they have of another person, motivated reasoning
leads them to activate this stereotype, and they will interact with them in a constrained
manner. In the same light, when a stereotype does not fit the initial impression, motivated
reasoning dictates the individual will inhibit that stereotype (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999).
This effect was demonstrated through individuals’ activation of a stereotype against
African-American individuals in a study where either a White or African-American
individual reviewed participants’ responses on an employee exercise. Participants
responded to criticism more harshly when they received a negative review from an
African-American individual rather than a White individual (Kunda & Sinclair, 1999).
Participants were motivated to undermine the evaluator because they had activated the
Black stereotype, and this motivation stemmed from the desire to defend their own
internal beliefs and self-views.
People also use motivated reasoning to support decisions they want to make.
When smokers had the urge to smoke, they accessed their preexisting beliefs about the
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positive aspects of smoking and suppressed the negative aspects. With these positive
aspects of smoking more salient to them, they reinforced these preexisting beliefs by
satisfying their urge to smoke (Sayette & Hufford, 1997). Motivated reasoning impacts
decision-making and interactions with other individuals.
Motivated reasoning translates to politics in that individuals with strong prior
political attitudes may selectively interpret information in a way that supports their
desired conclusion. Taber and Lodge (2016) posit that motivated reasoning produces an
automatic response, and exposure to items that engender a strong opinion—such as a
politician’s speech or news coverage of a major event—will trigger an immediate
reaction after exposure to the information. This immediate reaction is tied to hot
cognition, which refers to cognition that is influenced by an individual’s current
emotional state (Abelson, 1963). Regarding political news media coverage, Democrats
and Republicans may harbor strong positive or negative emotions about certain policies.
Motivated reasoning through hot cognition dictates that any time they are exposed to
news coverage on these hot-button issues, they will be triggered by their existing
emotional response to have an automatic reaction either in favor or against the coverage.
Individuals are motivated to adhere to their beliefs, and this motivation heavily influences
their cognition. One of the ways this motivation impacts individuals’ thought processes
occurs when they are exposed to information inconsistent with their beliefs.
Cognitive Dissonance
The theory of cognitive dissonance states that when individuals are exposed to
information inconsistent with their beliefs, they are motivated to resolve the discomfort

10
that arises from this inconsistency (Festinger, 1957). People reduce cognitive dissonance
through either changing one of the inconsistent beliefs to agree with the other, integrating
new information that outweighs the dissonant belief, or decreasing the importance of the
belief altogether. A classic study on cognitive dissonance showed that individuals
changed their previous personal ratings of a menial task from “boring” to “enjoyable,”
when they were paid $1 to tell another group of participants that the task they performed
was pleasant. They changed their personal ratings of the task to ensure their behaviors
and beliefs were not in conflict with one another, demonstrating a desire to reduce
feelings of dissonance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959).
The effects of cognitive dissonance have been shown in political contexts. One
study of cognitive dissonance in a political context asked participants to write counterattitudinal essays about the two most recent U.S. Presidents (Nam et al., 2013).
Specifically, conservatives had to write a counter-attitudinal essay about Obama (liberal)
and liberals had to write one about Bush (conservative). Conservatives were more likely
to refuse to write the essay than liberals were, indicating that conservatives may be more
guarded towards feelings of dissonance. In another study, participants were asked
whether they would like to hear arguments from opposing sides of the debate on samesex marriage and earn $10 or hear arguments that were compatible with their position on
the debate for only $7 (Frimer et al., 2017). Motivation to avoid cognitive dissonance was
evident in participants’ responses, with 63% of the participants choosing to forgo the
chance at the additional $3 given for hearing attitudes from the opposing side of the
debate. Individuals are more comfortable taking in information that is consistent with
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their position, and liberals and conservatives are both inclined to avoid feelings of
dissonance. Not only are individuals motivated to avoid inconsistent information, but
they also seek out information that is consistent with their beliefs.
Confirmation Bias
People tend to seek out information that agrees with their beliefs, a phenomenon
termed “confirmation bias” (Nickerson, 1998). In a classic study of confirmation bias,
participants created a sequence pattern of three numbers in a row. After being given an
example of a sequence by the researcher, participants developed constrained beliefs about
the rule, almost as if they developed their own understanding of the rule. They then only
created patterns that fit their understanding of the rule (Wason, 1960).
Confirmation bias is related to the concept of selective exposure, which refers to
how individuals tend to favor and seek out information that is consistent with their beliefs
and intentionally avoid information that opposes them (Klapper, 1960). In the 1940
Presidential election, more than 75% of voters had consumed media propaganda from
their own party, whereas only 20% had consumed media propaganda from an opposing
party (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948). Selective exposure is a way for individuals to avoid
dissonance-inducing information. Individuals are also more likely to spend time
interacting with news information that is consistent with their beliefs than information
that goes against their beliefs, and this finding occurs across cultures (Jonas et al., 2003;
Westerwick et al., 2013). Individuals are motivated to avoid or discredit information that
is contrary to their beliefs and only accept agreeable information as fact (Knobloch-
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Westerwick et al., 2017). Individuals seek out information that confirms their beliefs, but
they also process incoming information in a biased way to fit their beliefs as well.
Biased Assimilation
The ways in which people intake and interact with new information often depends
on their existing beliefs. Biased assimilation refers to the tendency for
individuals to interpret new information that supports their position more positively
than information that does not (Lord et al., 1979). Sometimes referred to as “motivated
skepticism,” when assimilating information in a biased way, individuals tend to
emphasize incoming information that supports their beliefs and weaken or undermine
arguments against it. Additionally, individuals’ attitudes may become more polarized
because of this biased assimilation of information (Lord et al., 1979; Taber & Lodge,
2006). The biased processing of information is reflective of individuals’ ties to their
preexisting beliefs, and the ways in which they defend or bolster them.
Biased assimilation of information exists in the political landscape, particularly in
the ways in which liberals and conservatives evaluate arguments from either side.
Conservatives and liberals each read information relating to one of three political issues
(i.e., abortion, illegal immigration, economic inequality) and viewed articles with
opposing arguments as more negative than articles with supporting ones (Suhay &
Erisen, 2018). They were also more inclined to provide counterarguments when exposed
to information from the opposing position. Both liberals and conservatives also perceived
their candidate (i.e., Kerry, Bush) to be the winner of a 2004 Presidential debate,
indicating they emphasized or focus on supporting information to their position
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(Richardson et al., 2008). Both liberals and conservatives are inclined to process political
information in a biased way and will emphasize information supporting their viewpoint
and minimize or counter the information against it.
Summary
Cognitive dissonance suggests that individuals are motivated to resolve the
feelings of discomfort that arise from conflicting cognitions and beliefs. Confirmation
bias suggests that individuals intentionally seek out information that is consistent with
their beliefs. Selective exposure is related to confirmation bias due to it being the act of
avoiding information that is disconfirming of one’s beliefs. Biased assimilation indicates
individuals interact with incoming information in a way that supports their position,
which includes highlighting supporting arguments and minimizing or dismissing the
opposing ones. These terms all fit under the overall umbrella term of motivated
reasoning, where people are driven by preexisting beliefs to act in a certain way.
Each of these phenomena are evident in politics through the ways people interact
and interpret information. Individuals avoid or dismiss information contrary to their
beliefs, actively seek out information that confirms them, and interpret incoming
information supporting their stance in a more positive light than information that goes
against it. With the growing partisan divide on political issues, individuals are more
motivated than ever to act in ways that support or defend their political stance. In this
regard, people respond to information in a way that aligns with their beliefs, and one of
these ways is by perceiving neutral information as biased. This tendency is the essence of
the hostile media effect. The strength of the hostile media effect is influenced by factors
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such as the news source presenting the information, the perceived reach of the news
source, and the strength of an individual’s partisan identity.
Factors Affecting the Hostile Media Effect
News Source
Perceptions of the news source contribute to the presence of the hostile media
effect. Individuals who believe a particular news source to be partial to the opposing side
may perceive bias in the story they present (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994). Liberals
and conservatives each viewed taped news stories from the Fox and CNN networks, and
liberals perceived more bias in the Fox News network story, whereas conservatives
perceived more bias in the CNN network story (Coe et al., 2008). Supporters of a hometown sports team perceived more bias in a neutral news article about an NCAA
investigation into their school when the article was presented with the rival team’s
newspaper source heading than when the article was presented with the home-town
team’s newspaper source heading (Arpan & Raney, 2003). Native Americans perceived
more hostile media bias in an article – written on the genetic modification of natively
cultivated wild rice – from an opposing source than from a source that closely identified
with their position (Gunther et al., 2009). The manipulations of the news sources
presenting the article have elicited perceptions of bias against one’s own stance.
Biased news source perceptions are also impacted by beliefs about the source’s
credibility. Individuals perceive a message more favorably when it is presented from a
news source they deem to have “high credibility,” (Gunther, 1992). Credibility attached
to a source may depend on the agreement of the source’s content with the individual’s
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stance. Individuals tend to rely on the news sources they deem the most credible, which is
typically the source that aligns with their position, and this tendency leads to biased
perceptions of news information when it is presented in a rival or oppositional source.
Perceived Reach of Source
The perceived reach of the source—how widespread and disseminated its
information is—may impact hostile media perceptions because it leads people to perceive
that others will be influenced by the media message. People were more likely to perceive
the hostile media effect when information was presented from a “high reach” news source
(e.g., a prominent news source) than from a “low reach” news source (e.g., a college
essay; Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Gunther & Schmitt, 2004). Republicans perceived
more hostile media bias in a tweet when it came from an account with 503,000 followers
compared to when it was from an account with 21 followers (Lee et al., 2018). This
impact is of greater importance when factoring in the thoughts and beliefs of partisans.
Partisans are more concerned with public issues that are of great importance, which are
usually covered by large media sources, and so they may be more cognizant of the impact
mass media has on popular opinion (Gunther & Liebhart, 2006). Perceived reach of a
source has considerable influence on the hostile media effect given that individuals may
perceive more bias in news coverage presented from a source with a large audience as
opposed to one with a small audience.
Partisan Identity
The strength of an individual’s allegiance to their partisan side, which includes
the level of identification with their in-group as well as animosity towards the out-group,
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appear to be directly tied to their perceptions of hostile media bias. Partisans with
stronger in-group identifications are more likely to perceive information presented from
an outgroup source more negatively and are also more likely to denigrate the source
(Daily, 2014). Partisans may activate an ingroup-versus-outgroup schema when exposed
to information from an opposing source that does not align with their stance. These
effects may be explained by self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), which asserts
that a key component of one’s self-concept is their identification with social groups
(Reid, 2012). Partisans who had their identities activated by a precursor message to an
article perceived more media bias against their political position than the control group,
indicating a self-categorization effect (Reid, 2012). Partisans indicate less agreement, and
more bias, with a source that does not align with their political views due to this source
being identified with the outgroup.
Hostile media perceptions are also stronger among individuals with a stronger
identification with their in-group (Ariyanto et al., 2007; Matheson & Dursun, 2001).
Individuals with strong in-group identifications with political positions seek out so-called
“villains” and “victims” to distinguish between their in-group and outgroup members. A
stronger in-group identification may be activated when individuals are exposed to
partisan issues that are more important to them. This in-group identification would in turn
strengthen their opinions and beliefs, causing them to become more extreme (Harton &
Latané, 1997). Individuals who demonstrate a strong in-group identification are far more
likely to perceive hostile media bias in news coverage (Matheson & Dursun, 2001).
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An individual’s allegiance to a certain political position can impact how they
perceive bias in the media, as well as its perceived influence on others. Individuals with
partisan positions inconsistent with a partisan news source perceived more bias in the
source than those whose position was consistent with the source (Kim, 2016).
Additionally, individuals voted more strongly against or in favor of political initiatives,
such as clean energy efforts, when the topics were directly referenced by highly
influential political leaders, such as the President (Crowe, 2020). A higher profile, or
higher reach, source may pose more of a threat to one’s own partisan identity due to the
increased number of people that could be swayed by the source. Indeed, individuals with
a stronger identity to their group are more likely to perceive bias in a news source not
affiliated with their group. Individuals who identify as nationalists perceived more hostile
bias towards the U.S. in news stories from international news sources (Golan et al.,
2021). A stronger partisan identity may amplify these perceived media biases overall, as
individuals are more motivated to defend their in-group from information that is
disseminated from opposing news sources.
There may be differences between liberals and conservatives in how partisan
identity impacts their perceptions of hostile media bias. Conservatives believe that the
media has more of a liberal spin and is thus biased against them (Domke et al., 1999).
Conversely, liberals may believe that news media has a conservative slant (Mayer, 2005).
The truth is that media bias exists on the part of both partisan political positions. The rise
of 24-hour news networks has created platforms for both liberal and conservative-leaning
news sources to build their influence and reach. There are prominent conservative TV
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networks (e.g., Fox News) and liberal TV networks (e.g., CNN), and numerous online
political sources (e.g., Breitbart, The Blaze, The Atlantic, Politico). With the
dissemination of a wide range of information, which may be biased towards a liberal or
conservative viewpoint, it is crucial to study the hostile media effect and its relationship
with the reach of news sources. This research will help individuals recognize bias in the
way information is presented, and researchers develop strategies to counteract it.
Current Study
The hostile media effect refers to how individuals perceive even neutral news
coverage as biased against their stance (Vallone et al., 1985). This effect is a subset of the
field of motivated reasoning, with components such as cognitive dissonance,
confirmation bias, and selective exposure all providing a foundation for the phenomenon.
The hostile media effect transpires in political contexts with perceptions by Democrats
and Republicans of bias in media coverage, and can depend on the news source
presenting the coverage (Arpan & Raney, 2003; Gunther et al., 2009), the perceived reach
of the source (Gunther & Schmitt, 2004), and the strength of partisan identity in the
individual perceiving the coverage (Daily, 2014).
In a previous study, I assessed level of perceived bias in an article depending on
the source heading (Sedlacek & Harton, 2019). One hundred fifty Amazon Mechanical
Turk (mTurk) participants read an article detailing the recent passage of the U.S. Farm
Bill with an NBC News heading (liberal source) or a Fox News heading (conservative
source) and rated the bias and quality of the article. Those who identified as conservative
rated the article as lower quality when they were presented with the liberal source
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heading, and those who identified as liberal rated the article as lower quality when they
were presented with the conservative source heading. Political orientation and source did
not affect ratings of liberal/conservative bias in the article. Finding differences in
perceived article quality based on the source indicated individuals recognized the source.
However, the finding of no differences in perceived liberal or conservative bias was
contrary to this idea and it needed to be examined in future research. It is not clear
whether the results may have been affected by low power in some conditions or
participants being unfamiliar with the NBC News header and its liberal stance (Sedlacek
& Harton, 2019).
The current study used similar methodology to Sedlacek and Harton (2019), but
also assessed the moderation of news source reach on the relationship between an
individual’s political orientation and their perceptions of bias. The current study was a 2
(liberal/conservative source) x 2 (low/high perceived reach) x 2 (liberal/conservative
participant) between groups factorial design.
The current study addressed several gaps in hostile media effect research. There is
a need in hostile media effect research to synthesize indicators of perceived bias such as
agreement with the article and quality of the article. These variables are often assessed in
separate studies from one another, and the current study addresses each of them as
indicators of perceived bias. There is also a need in hostile media effect research to
further address social media metrics (e.g., likes, shares, views) and how they impact
perceptions of source reach, because consumption of news has shifted largely from print
news to websites and social media platforms. Specifically, it is important to assess
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whether these metrics can be manipulated in studies of perceived source reach, so that
participants can identify whether a news source has a low or a high reach based on these
numbers. Research conducted in the mid-2000s by Gunther and colleagues, that used
print news sources (e.g., newspapers), needs to be translated to today’s digital news
media society. Therefore, present day indicators of online news consumption (i.e., social
media metrics) should be applied to the methodology previously used in hostile media
effect research to examine whether the findings have changed.
The current study addressed these gaps by investigating perceptions of the
article’s quality and ratings of an individual’s agreement with the content presented in the
article as indicators of perceived bias. Additionally, the current study investigated how
social media metrics that are often included on online news articles directly influence
individual perceptions of the reach of the source. Participants read an article with a liberal
(i.e., The Progressive, CNN) or conservative (i.e., PatriotNewsDaily, Fox) news source. I
manipulated perceived reach by having participants read an article with a smalleraudience source heading (i.e., The Progressive, PatriotNewsDaily) or a larger-audience
source heading (i.e., CNN, Fox). I also manipulated perceived reach using the social
media metrics of article views, article shares, and website subscriptions. Social media
metrics are a more modern indicator of perceived reach beyond traditional print media
sources (Stavrositu & Kim, 2014). All “high-reach” sources had article views and website
subscription numbers over 1,000, whereas the “low-reach” sources had all of their social
media metrics under 1,000. Two groups (i.e., liberal, conservative) were compared in
regards to their perceptions of hostile media bias, their perceptions of article quality, and
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their agreement with the article. Partisan identity’s relationships with the three dependent
variables were assessed in exploratory analyses, given that the strength of an individual’s
partisan identity has been previously associated with perceptions of bias (Ariyanto et al.,
2007; Matheson & Dursun, 2001; Reid, 2012).
I also evaluated perceived objectivity versus subjectivity of each article as well as
the perceived informativeness of the article; however, these evaluations were conducted
in an exploratory manner. I evaluated ratings of objectivity versus subjectivity on a slider
asking participants whether the article contained “mostly fact-based” or “mostly opinonbased” content. I evaluated ratings of informativeness by assessing the strength of
participants’ agreement with how informative the article was. There are several websites
that employ independent researchers to dissect media content of various political sources
in order to most accurately depict their partisan slant to concerned news consumers. One
of these sources, mediabiasfactcheck.com, was used in order to identify the source
content adapted for the current study. The following hypotheses and research questions
were tested in the current study:
•

H1: Conservatives will rate an article as more biased against conservatives
when presented with a liberal news source heading. Liberals will rate an
article as more biased against liberals when presented with a conservative
news source heading.

•

H2: Conservatives will rate an article as lower quality when presented
with a liberal news source heading, whereas liberals will rate an article as
lower quality when presented with a conservative news source heading.
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•

H3: Conservatives will indicate more agreement with an article when it is
presented with a conservative news source heading than when it is
presented with a liberal news source heading. Liberals will indicate more
agreement with an article when it is presented with a liberal news source
heading than when it is presented with a conservative news source
heading.

•

H4: Perceived reach of the news source will moderate these effects, such
that ratings of the article will be more negative when conservatives view
the article with the high-reach liberal news source heading (CNN) than
when they view the article with the low-reach liberal news source heading
(The Progressive). Likewise, ratings of the article will be more negative
when liberals view the article with the high-reach conservative news
source heading (Fox News) than when they view the article with the lowreach conservative news source heading (PatriotNewsDaily).

In exploratory analyses, I assessed partisan identity’s correlation with the three dependent
variables (ratings of article bias, quality, and agreement with the article) using the
Partisan Identity Scale (Huddy & Bankert, 2017).
Pilot Study
I conducted a pilot study to test a number of important aspects for the primary
study. The pilot study assessed the perceived neutrality of the two different articles used
in the primary study (i.e., U.S. Farm Bill article, military housing article), the perceived
liberal or conservative stances of sources, and perceived reach of these sources.
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Additionally, this tested whether the sources were perceived to have a “high” or “low”
reach. The results of the pilot study determined which article was used in the primary
study, and which four source headings were manipulated with that article.
Method
Participants. I recruited 90 participants (59% Male, 39% Female; Age M =
24.22, SD = 14.05; 81.1% White/Caucasian, 7.8% Hispanic/Latinx, 6.7% Black/African
American, 4.4% Asian/Pacific Islander, 1.1% Multiracial; 61.6% liberal, 31.1%
conservative, 7.8% Moderate) through Amazon Mechanical Turk for the pilot study. I set
CloudResearch to block duplicate IP addresses and suspicious or duplicate geocodes. I
required participants to have a 99% hit approval rate and between 5,000-500,000
approved hits. I limited the sample to US citizens only. Additionally, I used the
CloudResearch panels to only include people in my study who identified as Democrat or
Republican in their political views, and exclude those who identified as Independent. I
compensated participants $0.50 for completing the study.
Procedure. Participants either read an article on the U.S. Farm Bill or a military
bill with low or high reach metrics. These articles were adapted from articles published
on Reuters.com. This website was determined to have little to no partisan bias, and more
moderate reporting overall (mediabiasfactcheck.com). The articles were modified to
ensure they were as neutral as possible, with the number of liberal and conservative
arguments being balanced. Specifically, there were three arguments on both sides in the
U.S. Farm Bill article, and one argument on each side in the military housing bill article.
These articles had no source headings, and low versus high reach was manipulated
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through using different social media metrics at the bottom of each article. The low-reach
articles had less than 5,000 views, less than 1,000 shares and less than 1,000 website
subscriptions. The high-reach articles had more than 1,000,000 views, more than 100,000
shares, and more than 1,000,000 website subscriptions.
After reading the article, participants completed a questionnaire assessing their
perceptions of the article quality and their perceptions of liberal or conservative bias in
the article content itself (see Appendix A).
Then, participants completed a manipulation check that was multiple choice,
asking them to estimate the number of views the article had. This item assessed whether
the participants paid attention to the social media metrics at the bottom of the article (see
Appendix B). Participants also completed an item assessing whether they agreed the
article was informative or not and an item asking them to indicate whether the article was
fact-based or opinion-based (see Appendix A).
Participants then rated their perceptions of the political stances (liberal or
conservative), their ratings of the size of the audience (i.e., “Small”, “Medium-sized”,
“Large”), and their ratings of trustworthiness of several news outlets (e.g., Fox News,
CNN, Wall Street Journal) (See Table 1). The questionnaire also included an adapted
form of the Partisan Identity Scale (Huddy & Bankert, 2017). This scale was created to
measure partisanship as a social identity, and the converging of one’s partisan identity
with their sense of self (see Appendix C).
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Results and Discussion
An independent samples t-test revealed participants who read the article on the
U.S. Farm Bill indicated that it was closer to moderate politically (M = 3.12, SD = 1.41)
than those who read the article on the military housing bill (M = 2.17, SD = 1.25; 1-7
scale). There were 16 participants who were not able to identify the article they just read.
Roughly 39% of all participants had stated the number of views in the article they read
was in the smaller range of 1,000-100,000. Due to a coding error, I was not able to
identify the differences between low-reach and high-reach views manipulations. In openended responses, participants indicated they had to guess on the number of views the
article had. Therefore, in the main study I moved the metrics to the top of the article
instead of the bottom in order to make them more noticeable for the reader. I also used
the U.S. Farm Bill as the article I manipulated with different headings since participants
perceived it to be more neutral than the military housing bill article.
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Table 1
Article Bias Ratings, Perceived Source Audience Size, and Perceived Article Views
(Percentages)
Bias Ratings

CNN

PatriotNewsDaily

Fox News

The Progressive

Liberal

32.4

4.5

2.7

30.6

Slightly Liberal
Neutral

22.5
14.4

3.6
26.1

4.5
3.6

17.1
27

Slightly Conservative
Conservative

11.7
5.4

23.4
28.8

14.4
60.4

5.4
7.2

Mean (1-5 Scale)

2.25

3.79

4.46

2.33

Audience Size

CNN

PatriotNewsDaily

Fox News

The Progressive

Small Audience
Medium-sized Audience
Large Audience

9.9
6.3
66.7

67.6
10.8
4.5

8.1
9.9
65.8

63.1
16.2
5.4

Number of
Views

Less
than
1,000

1,000100,000

100,000500,000

500,0001,000,000

More than
1,000,000

Mean
(1-5
scale)

9.9

38.7

15.3

4.5

18

2.79

Tests of perceived liberal or conservative bias showed that 63% of the participants
identified CNN as having a liberal bias and 74.8% of participants identified Fox News as
having a conservative bias. This demonstrated that the two largest mainstream media
sources were perceived to have their liberal and conservative stances, respectively. The
two smaller-scale sources that had the highest percentages of perceived bias in the liberal
or conservative direction were The Progressive and PatriotNewsDaily, with 56% of
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participants identifying The Progressive as having a liberal bias, and 52.2% of
participants identifying PatriotNewsDaily as having a conservative bias.
In tests of the perceived source reach, both conservative sources were identified
as having their correct reach, with 67.6% of participants identifying PatriotNewsDaily as
having a small audience and 65.8% of participants identifying Fox News as having a
large audience. Similar results were found with the two liberal sources, with 76%
viewing The Progressive as having a small audience and 80% of participants identifying
CNN as having a large audience. These findings led me to use The Progressive as the
low-reach liberal source, CNN as the high-reach liberal source, PatriotNewsDaily as the
low-reach conservative source, and Fox News as the high-reach conservative source in
the primary study.
Method
All materials used in the procedure and the planned analyses were preregistered
on the Open Science Framework website:
https://osf.io/atjzf/?view_only=330a3b87c6b942fca63c9f2648985a70 (Open Science
Collaboration, 2015).
Design
This study used a 2 (political affiliation of news source; liberal/conservative) x 2
(perceived reach of news source; Low/High) x 2 (individual’s political affiliation;
liberal/conservative) between groups factorial design.
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Participants
Three hundred sixty participants (42.9% Male, 56% Female; Age M = 28.28, SD
= 13.52; 77.3% White/Caucasian, 10.2% Black/African American, 7.8% Asian/Pacific
Islander, 4.7% Hispanic/Latinx, 1.7% Multiracial; 59.6% liberal, 34.6% conservative,
5.3% Moderate) were recruited using CloudResearch, an online crowdsourcing platform,
to participate in a study assessing their evaluations of the quality of news articles.
CloudResearch was set to block duplicate IP addresses and suspicious or duplicate
geocodes. Participants were required to have a 99% hit approval rate and between 5,000500,000 approved hits. The sample was limited to US citizens only. Like the pilot study, I
used the CloudResearch panels to only include people in my study who identified as
Democrat or Republican in their political views, and exclude those who identified as
Independent. Participants were compensated $0.50 for their completion of the study.
After all data cleaning and the exclusion of participants who identified as having a
moderate political orientation from analyses, 143 participants (38.4% Male, 60.9%
Female; Age M = 28.74, SD = 13.59; 76.8% White/Caucasian, 10.6% Black/African
American, 7.3% Asian/Pacific Islander, 4.6% Hispanic/Latinx, 3.3% Multiracial; 61.6%
liberal, 33.1% conservative) were included in data analyses.
I determined a suggested sample size of 360 participants through conducting a
power analysis using G*power (Faul et al., 2007). Gunther and Liebhart’s (2006) study
assessing perceived reach of source’s moderation of the hostile media effect yielded an
effect size of partial 2=.01. However, Gunther et al., (2009) yielded an effect size of
partial 2=.02. Given this discrepancy, and that multiple studies similar to my design
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have yielded results in a range of small to medium effects, I decided to split the
difference between a small effect size (partial 2=.01) and medium effect size (partial 2=
.025) and inputted the effect size partial n2 =.015 into my power analysis. This effect size
was used to find the desired sample size for a two-tailed ANOVA assessing group
differences between liberals and conservatives, depending on the political orientation of
the source and the source reach. The desired power in this power analysis calculation was
.90 with an alpha level set at .05, number of groups set at 8, and a numerator df set at 1.
The power analysis yielded a recommended sample size of 327 participants.
Procedure
Participants first read an electronic consent form, and then read that the study
would assess their evaluations of the quality of news information. They were randomly
assigned to read an article about the recently passed U.S. Farm Bill, with either a Fox
News heading used from their site, foxnews.com (high-reach conservative condition),
CNN news heading used from their site, cnn.com (high-reach liberal condition),
PatriotNewsDaily news heading used from their site, patriotnewsdaily.com (low-reach
conservative condition), or The Progressive news heading from their site, progressive.org
(low-reach liberal condition; see Appendix D). Although the legislation exists and did
pass, some details about the bill in the article were falsified, such as the impact the bill
had on food stamps recipients. Specifically, the number of arguments that would be
classified as more liberal were balanced with the number of arguments that would be
classified as conservative (see Appendix E). This manipulation was done in order to
balance the number of liberal and conservative arguments in the article and contribute to
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its overall neutrality. In addition, the low-reach news source conditions included smaller
social media metrics (i.e., 4,754 views, 346 shares, 897 website subscriptions), whereas
the high-reach news source conditions included larger social media metrics (i.e.,
3,859,567 views, 302,781 shares, 5,067,435 website subscriptions). The survey also
recorded the time participants spent reading the article.
Participants then completed a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of the
article along with two manipulation checks. The items assessing participants’ perceptions
of bias against a conservative or liberal viewpoint were adapted from similar items used
in Gunther and Liebhart (2006). Then, participants completed a questionnaire addressing
their political orientation, level of partisan identity, and basic demographic questions. I
assessed partisan identity using an adapted subscale of the Partisan Identity Scale created
by Huddy and Bankert (2017). Participants completed two open-ended response items
asking them to write what the article was about in their own words and whether they had
comments for the researchers.
I debriefed participants on the true focus and goals of the study and indicated to
them that the article was falsified in order to accomplish the study’s goals. I included this
debriefing on the “end of survey” screen and then directed participants out of the survey
after completion (see Appendix F).
Measures
Article bias against conservative viewpoint and liberal viewpoint items. Two
items adapted from those used by Gunther and Liebhart (2006) assessed perceived bias
on a 7-point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree and 7=Strongly Agree). I analyzed these
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items separately due to there being a low correlation between the two items (r = -.27).
The first item assessed perceived article bias against conservatives: “I feel the article was
biased against a conservative viewpoint.” The second item on perceived bias assessed
perceived article bias against liberals: “I feel the article was biased against a liberal
viewpoint.” (see Appendix A).
Quality of article item. One item assessed perceived quality of the article on a 7point Likert scale (1=Very poor quality and 7=Very high quality): “Please rate the quality
of the article you just read.” (see Appendix A).
Agreement item. One item assessed agreement with the article’s content on a 7point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree and 7=Strongly Agree): “Please indicate the
extent to which you agree with the content of the article you read.” (see Appendix A).
Fact-Based versus Opinion-Based Item. One item assessed the level of
perceived fact-based information or opinion based information in the article on a graphic
slider from 1-100, with the bar starting in the middle of the slider for the participants to
drag to either side: “On the slider below, please indicate the extent to which you thought
the article you read contained opinion-based information or fact-based information” (see
Appendix A).
Informative Item. One item assessed the informativeness of the article on a 7point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree and 7=Strongly Agree): “Please indicate the
extent to which, if any, you agree with the following statement: The article was
informative” (see Appendix A).
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Manipulation check item. One item served as a perceived reach manipulation
check on a 7-point Likert scale (1=hardly any people and 7=extremely large number of
people): “On a scale of 1-7, with 1 meaning hardly any people and 7 meaning an
extremely large number of people, indicate the size of the message’s audience” (see
Appendix B).
Attention check items. Participants completed two attention checks throughout
the study, with the first one as follows: “Please identify the source of the article you just
read.” Participants chose from a list of five sources to answer this check. The second
attention check was the following: “In your own words, please describe what you thought
the article you read was about.” This item was an open-ended response item with a
comment box. (see Appendix B).
Partisan identity scale. I asked participants to indicate the political party, if any,
they identified most with, and to choose from the following options: Democrat (liberal),
Republican (conservative), Independent, Green Party, Libertarian, No Affiliation, and
Other (please specify) with a comment box. They completed four items in an adapted
subscale of the Partisan Identity Scale, which assessed participants’ levels of partisan
identity relative to the party they indicated they identified the most with (Huddy &
Bankert, 2017). This scale has greater predictive validity than single-item assessments of
partisan identity. These items were answered on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly
disagree and 7=strongly agree). An example of an item on this subscale is, “When I
speak about this party, I usually say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’” (=.85; see Appendix C).
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Demographic questions. Participants answered basic demographic questions
including gender, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment (see Appendix G).
Honesty check. I asked participants the following question: “How honest were
you in answering the questions on this survey? You will receive compensation regardless
of your answer” (see Appendix G).
Comment box. I asked participants if they had any additional comments for the
researchers, and I provided them a text box for their answer.
Plan of Analysis
To test hypotheses 1 to 3, I conducted four ANOVAs to compare the differences
between liberals and conservatives, depending on the political orientation of the source
(i.e., liberal, conservative), on the four dependent variables (i.e., ratings of bias against a
conservative viewpoint, ratings of bias against a Liberal viewpoint, ratings of article
quality, ratings of agreement with the article’s content). To test hypothesis 4, I did a
second set of ANOVAs adding perceived reach (i.e., low, high) as an additional
independent variable. Because of unequal cell sizes, I chose to run two separate sets of
analyses because of potential differences in results between the 2 x 2 and the 2 x 2 x 2
ANOVA. Initially, I had pre-registered that I would use the Process macro (Hayes, 2013)
to test moderation, but because of program limitations and because all variables were
categorical, I did ANOVAs instead. I conducted exploratory analyses to assess the
within-cell correlations between each of the four dependent variables.
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Results
Data Cleaning
Based on pre-registration criteria, I excluded 199 cases due to participants failing
the attention check asking them to identify the source they read. Participants did not fail
the other attention check (i.e., open-ended response describing what the article was
about). I excluded 9 cases due to participants not meeting the three-minute minimum time
requirement, and 2 cases due to participants indicating they were “not at all honest” or
“slightly honest” on the honesty check. After these exclusions, there were 151 remaining
cases.
To conduct the analyses comparing the differences between liberals and
conservatives, participants were coded as “1 = conservative” if they identified their
political orientation anywhere from 1-3 (1=extremely conservative and 3=lean
conservative) and “2 = liberal” if they identified their political orientation anywhere from
5-7 (5=lean liberal and 7=extremely liberal). Participants who identified themselves in
the middle (i.e., 4=moderate) were excluded from analyses. There were 8 participants
who identified themselves as moderates. After exclusion of these cases and all other
exclusions, there were 143 participants included in the analyses.
Tests of Assumptions
Due to unequal n’s in each condition, I used Bartlett’s test of homogeneity to test
the assumption of equal variances. The assumption of homogeneity of variance was not
violated for article bias ratings against a conservative viewpoint based on political
orientation (= .14, p = .71) or source reach (2 = 2.02, p = .16), for article bias ratings
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against a liberal viewpoint based on political orientation (2 = .055, p = .81) or source
reach (2 = .12, p =.73), for article quality ratings based on political orientation (2 =
2.41, p =.12) or source reach (2 = .03, p = .86), or for agreement with article’s content
based on political orientation (2 = 1.23, p = .27) or source reach (2 = .665, p =.42). The
assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated for article bias ratings against a
conservative viewpoint based on source political orientation (2 = .03, p = .86), for article
bias ratings against a Liberal viewpoint based on source political orientation (2 = .00, p
= .99), for article quality ratings based on source political orientation (2 = 1.32, p = .25),
or for agreement with the article’s content based on source political orientation (2 = .09,
p = .77).
Manipulation check
To test the effectiveness of the manipulation, I conducted an independent samples
t-test to assess the differences in participants’ perceived number of views of the article
they read. Participants perceived the article in the high-reach condition (M = 3.60, SD =
1.48) as having a larger number of views than the article in the low-reach condition (M =
1.97, SD = .55), suggesting the manipulation was valid, t(141) = -8.58, p < .001, d = 1.46,
95% CI: [1.114, 1.857].
Additionally, I set a timer to check how much time participants spent reading the
article. On average, participants included in analyses spent 576 seconds (about 10
minutes) reading the article in the study. There were 9 participants excluded from
analyses due to viewing the article for less than 180 seconds (3 minutes). For participants
included in analyses, the shortest amount of time spent reading the article was 194
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seconds (a little over 3 minutes), while the longest amount of time spent was 7,433
seconds (a little over 2 hours).
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1. The first ANOVA assessed differences between liberals and
conservatives on article bias ratings against a conservative viewpoint, depending on the
source political orientation. Participants who were politically conservative rated the
article as being more biased against conservatives (M = 3.50, SD = 1.71) than did liberals
(M = 2.58, SD = 1.28), F(1, 143) = 6.539, p = .012, partial 2 = .05, 95% CI: [.002, .124].
There was not a main effect of source political orientation, F(1, 143) = 1.511, p = .22,
partial 2 = .01. There was not a significant interaction between source political
orientation and the participant political orientation, F(1, 143) = .143, p = .71, partial 2 =
.001 (see Figure 1).
The second ANOVA assessed differences between liberals and conservatives on
article bias ratings against a liberal viewpoint, depending on the source political
orientation. Participants who were politically liberal rated the article as being more biased
against liberals (M = 3.83, SD = 1.65) than did conservatives (M = 2.64, SD = 1.43), F(1,
143) = 4.586, p = .034, partial 2 = .03, 95% CI: [0, .105]. Participants who read the
article with a conservative source heading rated the article as being more biased against
liberals (M = 3.55, SD = 1.56) than those who read the article with a liberal source
heading (M = 2.91, SD = 1.56), F(1, 143) = 5.037, p = .026, partial 2 = .04, 95% CI: [0,
.109]. There was not a significant interaction between source political orientation and
participant political orientation, F(1, 143) = .417, p > .05, partial 2 = .003 (see Figure 2).
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Overall, the hypothesis that conservatives will perceive more bias in an article with a
liberal source heading, and that liberals would do so when the article is presented with a
conservative source heading, was not supported.

Figure 1. Article Bias Ratings Against a Conservative Viewpoint.
Mean Article Bias Ratings Against a Conservative Viewpoint Depending on Source
Political Orientation
7

Mean article bias ratings

6
5
4
3
2
1
conservative (n = 22)

liberal (n = 46)

liberal source

conservative (n = 28)

liberal (n = 47)

conservative source

Note. Error bars represent standard error of each value. “Conservative” and “liberal” labels

refer to participant political orientation unless otherwise specified. Higher ratings indicate
stronger perceptions of bias.
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Figure 2. Article Bias Ratings Against a Liberal Viewpoint.
Mean Article Bias Ratings Against a Liberal Viewpoint Depending on Source Political
Orientation
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Mean article bias ratings
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liberal (n = 46)

liberal source

conservative (n = 28)

liberal (n = 47)
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Note. Error bars represent standard error of each value. “Conservative” and “liberal” labels

refer to participant political orientation unless otherwise specified. Higher ratings indicarte
stronger perceptions of bias.

Hypothesis 2. The third ANOVA assessed differences between liberals and
conservatives on article quality ratings, depending on the source political orientation.
There was not a main effect of source political orientation, F(1, 143) = .009, p = .93,
partial 2 = .000. There was not a main effect of participant political orientation, F(1,
143) = .061, p = .81, partial 2 = .000. There was not a significant interaction between
source political orientation and participants’ political orientation, F(1, 143) = .378, p =
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.54, partial 2 = .003 (see Figure 3). Overall, the hypothesis that conservatives will rate
an article as lower quality when it is presented with a liberal source heading, and that
liberals would do so when the article is presented with a conservative source heading,
was not supported.

Figure 3. Article Quality Ratings
Mean Article Quality Ratings Depending on Source Political Orientation

Mean article quality ratings
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4
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1
conservative (n = 22)

liberal (n = 46)

liberal source

conservative (n = 28)

liberal (n = 47)

conservative source

Note. Error bars represent standard error of each value. “Conservative” and “liberal” labels

refer to participant political orientation unless otherwise specified. Higher ratings indicate
higher perceived article quality.

Hypothesis 3. The fourth ANOVA assessed differences between liberals and
conservatives on agreement with the article’s content, depending on the source political
orientation. There was a main effect of participant political orientation, as participants
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who were politically conservative had higher ratings of agreement (M = 4.58, SD = 1.05)
with the article than did liberals (M = 4.11, SD = 1.21) regardless of the source political
orientation, F(1, 143) = 5.240, p = .024, partial 2 = .04, 95% CI: [0, . 111]. There was
not a main effect of source political orientation, F(1, 143) = .487, p = .49, partial 2 =
.003. There was not a significant interaction between source political orientation and
participant political orientation, F(1, 143) = 1.001, p = .32, partial 2 = .007 (see Figure
4). Overall, the hypothesis that conservatives will indicate more agreement with an article
when it is presented with a conservative source heading rather than a liberal source
heading, and that liberals would do so when it is presented with a liberal source heading
versus a conservative one, was not supported.
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Figure 4. Agreement with Article content
Mean Ratings of Agreement with Article Content Depending on Source Political
Orientation
7

Mean agreement ratings
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liberal (n = 47)

conservative source

Note. Error bars represent standard error of each value. “Conservative” and “liberal” labels

refer to participant political orientation unless otherwise specified. Higher ratings indicate
stronger agreement with the article’s content.

Hypothesis 4. The first moderation model was a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with
participant political orientation, source political orientation, and source reach as the
independent variables and article bias ratings against a conservative viewpoint as the
dependent variable in the analysis. Participants who were politically conservative rated
the article as being more biased against conservatives (M = 3.50, SD = 1.71) than did
liberals (M = 2.58, SD = 1.28), F(1, 143) = 6.246, p = .014, partial 2 = .04, 95% CI:
[.002, .121]. The interaction between participant political orientation, source political
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orientation, and news source reach was not significant (see Table 2). Contrary to the
hypothesis, this result did not identify news source reach as a moderator of the
relationship between participant political orientation, source political orientation and
article bias ratings against a conservative viewpoint.

Table 2
Results of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Article Bias Ratings Against a Conservative Viewpoint
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
7
3.420
1.787
.095
Intercept
1
1132.005 591.704 .000
SourcePO
1
2.368
1.238
.268
SourceReach
1
6.793
3.551
.062
PartPO
1
11.949
6.246
.014*
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
.735
.384
.536
SourcePO*PartPO
1
.574
.300
.585
SourceReach*PartPO
1
.096
.050
.823
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 1
.164
.086
.770
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.085
.814
.009
.026
.044
.003
.002
.000
.001

The second moderation model included participant political orientation, source
political orientation, and source reach as the independent variables and article bias ratings
against a liberal viewpoint as the dependent variable in the analysis. There was a main
effect of participant political orientation, as participants who were politically liberal rated
the article as being more biased against liberals (M = 3.44, SD = 1.67) than did
conservatives (M = 2.88, SD = 1.37) regardless of the source political orientation, F(1,
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143) = 4.751, p = .031, partial 2 = .03, 95% CI: [0, .106]. Liberals rated the conservative
source heading as more biased (M = 3.83, SD = 1.65) against liberals than did
conservatives (M = 3.07, SD = 1.30), F(1, 143) = 4.568, p = .034, partial 2 = .03, 95%
CI: [0, .104]. The interaction between participant political orientation, source political
orientation, and news source reach was not significant (see Table 3). Contrary to the
hypothesis, this result did not identify news source reach as a moderator of the
relationship between participant political orientation and source political orientation on
article bias ratings against a liberal viewpoint.

Table 3
Results of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Article Bias Ratings Against a Liberal Viewpoint
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
7
5.411
2.279
.032
Intercept
1
1244.571 524.139 .000
SourcePO
1
10.847
4.568
.034*
SourceReach
1
.580
.244
.622
PartPO
1
11.282
4.751
.031*
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
.027
.011
.916
SourcePO*PartPO
1
.809
.341
.560
SourceReach*PartPO
1
8.190
3.449
.065
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 1
1.803
.759
.385
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.106
.795
.033
.002
.034
.000
.003
.025
.006

The third moderation model tested participant political orientation, source
political orientation, and source reach as the independent variables and article quality
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ratings as the dependent variable in the analysis. The interaction between participant
political orientation, source political orientation, and news source reach was not
significant (see Table 4). Contrary to the hypothesis, this result did not identify news
source reach as a moderator of the relationship between participant political orientation,
source political orientation and article quality ratings.

Table 4
Results of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Article Quality Ratings
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
7
.241
.196
.986
Intercept
1
2454.694 1994.407 .000
SourcePO
1
7.475E-5 .000
.994
SourceReach
1
.019
.015
.901
PartPO
1
.083
.067
.796
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
.260
.211
.646
SourcePO*PartPO
1
.440
.357
.551
SourceReach*PartPO
1
.365
.297
.587
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 1
.378
.307
.580
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.010
.937
.000
.000
.000
.002
.003
.002
.002

The fourth moderation model tested participant political orientation, source
political orientation, and source reach as the independent variables and ratings of
agreement as the dependent variable in the analysis. Participants who were politically
conservative indicated higher ratings of agreement with the article (M = 4.58, SD = 1.05)
than did liberals (M = 4.11, SD = 1.21) regardless of the source political orientation, F(1,

45
143) = 4.865, p = .029, partial 2 = .04, 95% CI: [0, .108]. The interaction between
participant political orientation, source political orientation, and news source reach was
not significant (See Table 5). Contrary to the hypothesis, this result did not identify news
source reach as a moderator of the relationship between participant political orientation,
source political orientation and ratings of agreement. Overall, the hypothesis that news
source reach would moderate the relationship between participant PO and article bias
ratings, article quality ratings, and ratings of agreement, was not supported.

Table 5
Results of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Ratings of Agreement
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
7
2.231
1.666
.122
Intercept
1
2420.681 1808.018 .000
SourcePO
1
.558
.417
.520
SourceReach
1
.111
.083
.774
PartPO
1
6.514
4.865
.029*
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
.377
.282
.596
SourcePO*PartPO
1
1.344
1.004
.318
SourceReach*PartPO
1
1.458
1.089
.299
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 1
2.530
1.890
.171
Note: * = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.080
.931
.003
.001
.035
.002
.007
.008
.014

Exploratory Analyses
In exploratory analyses, I conducted within-cell correlations between each of the
dependent variables (i.e., bias ratings against a liberal viewpoint, bias ratings against a

46
conservative viewpoint, article quality ratings, article agreement ratings) within each of
the eight conditions. Article quality ratings had a strong positive association with article
agreement ratings in the Low-reach liberal/conservative PO condition (r = .736, p =
.006). Those who rated the article as having a higher quality also indicated higher ratings
of agreement with the article. Article bias ratings against a liberal viewpoint had a strong
negative association with quality ratings in the High-reach liberal/conservative PO
condition (r = -.751, p = .012). Those who indicated higher ratings of bias against a
liberal viewpoint indicated lower quality ratings in this condition. Overall, the two
dependent variables with the highest correlations across all conditions were quality and
agreement ratings. The full table of correlations is displayed below (see Table 6).
Many participants failed the manipulation check asking them to identify the
source of the article they read. This failed check resulted in more than half of the cases’
data being excluded from analyses. Analyses were re-run with none of the cases
excluded in order to test the hypotheses using the full sample size (see Appendix H). The
pattern of results using all participants was similar as with the reduced sample;
conservatives perceived that the article was more biased against conservatives, whereas
liberals perceived the article as more biased against liberals. Conservatives agreed with
the article more than did liberals. Using the full sample, there was no longer an overall
difference by source on perceptions of bias against liberals. There were no other
significant effects, suggesting that the lack of differences by conditions was not likely
due to lack of statistical power.

Table 6
Within-cell Correlations Table
Low-reach Highlib-libPO
reach lib(n = 27)
libPO
(n = 19)

Low-reach
conslibPO
(n = 21)

Highreach
conslibPO
(n = 26)
-.093

Low-reach
consconsPO
(n = 15)

High-reach
consconsPO
(n = 13)

Bias ag lib-bias -.181
.676**
.080
.501
.126
ag conserv
Bias ag lib.039
.012
-.253
-.413*
.103
-.322
quality
Bias ag lib-.387*
-.183
-.487
-.536**
-.310
.014
agreement
Bias ag
-.216
.106
.125
.092
-.149
-.278
conserv-quality
Bias ag
.385*
-.014
.282
.267
-.334
-.506
conservagreement
Quality-.010
.085
.483*
.496**
.397
.506
agreement
* = correlation is significant at the .05 level ** = correlation is significant at the .01 level

Low-reach
lib-consPO
(n = 12)

High reach
lib-consPO
(n = 10)

-.147

.139

-.326

-.751*

-.159

-.196

-.065

-.313

-.216

-.668*

.736**

.653*
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Discussion
Participant political orientation impacted how partisans perceived bias in a neutral
news article, as conservatives indicated higher bias ratings against conservatives in the
article they read, whereas liberals indicated higher bias ratings against liberals,
demonstrating the hostile media effect (Vallone et al., 1985). Contrary to hypotheses,
however, this effect was not exacerbated by the perceived political orientation of the
news source, although participants of both political orientations perceived the article as
more biased against liberals when it had a conservative heading. Conservatives also
agreed more with the article. Unexpectedly, perceived reach of the article did not
moderate these effects.
Possible Explanations
Conservatives perceived more bias against their viewpoint and liberals perceived
more biased against their own viewpoint, regardless of the source. This finding provides
evidence of the hostile media effect at play, but it does not support the manipulation of
source as the factor. The activation of the individual’s partisan identity may be an
explanation for this result. Consistent with the self-categorization theory, an individual
who identifies with a partisan position may have this identity become salient to them
through the presentation of political news content (Reid, 2012). This effect can occur
without the recognition of the source’s political orientation, but rather by the exposure to
the political content itself.
There were few news source effects in the study. Participants may not have been
as focused on the source as what was predicted. A 2018 Pew research survey suggests
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that online news consumers may have difficulties recalling the news source that they
obtained their information from (Mitchell et al., 2017). Specifically, online news
consumers between the ages of 18 and 29 recalled a news soure they accessed two hours
prior about 47 percent of the time. On average across all age groups, people were able to
recall the news source only 56 percent of the time. This finding translates to social media
platforms, as individuals tend to show a lack of memory of a source when the source’s
headline is presented on Twitter (Bourne et al., 2020). When a news article with a CNN
headline is presented on Twitter, there is less source memory than when reading the
source on the actual website. Individuals separating a news source from its content is
problematic in terms of looking at source effects in research on hostile media perceptions
because manipulating the source itself may not influence perceptions of bias as strongly
as previous research suggests.
Additionally, news presentation on social media platforms does not display the
source as prominently as they do in print, which may lead to less focus on the source
itself. Previous hostile media effect research that used source manipulations used print
news source manipulations in the early to mid-2000s (Gunther & Liebhart, 2006; Gunther
et al., 2009). People may be more inclined to focus on the news source when looking at a
print newspaper than an online article, as the individual could continually see the source
on each page, whereas in an online article they could immediately scroll down to the
content. Another explanation for the lack of source effects is the way in which
individuals are conditioned to respond to information that is more educational or
explanatory of the issue at hand as opposed to information that is less direct and more
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focused on affective assoications with the information. A central route of persuasion
would dictate that individuals are more focused on information directly related to the
issue as opposed to the peripheral route, which focuses more on affective cues or ones
that are not necessarily directly tied to the root of the issue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). If
individuals are more focused on the information itself, such as the reporting that
legislation was passed or vetoed, they may be less inclined to pay attention to the source
presenting the information, and thus perceive bias.
One final possible explanation for the lack of source effects is the idea that certain
individuals are conditioned to see news articles as biased regardless of the source. There
are well-supported claims that conservatives tend to see all media as biased, and that they
generally perceive it to have a liberal slant (Domke et al., 1999). Individuals who
generally perceive the media to be biased would be more likely to indicate stronger
perceptions of bias in the news information they interact with. Gauging the general
perceptions of media bias that an individual has prior to even reading a news article could
indicate whether a manipulation of source impacts the hostile media effect.
News source reach also did not affect impressions of bias, quality, or agreement.
A possible explanation for the lack of effects of news source reach is the lack of
recognition of the two low-reach sources (i.e., The Progressive, PatriotNewsDaily). This
was reflected in the open-ended response data, as many participants indicated they
guessed on the metrics associated with these news articles due to not being familiar with
the source. Individuals may also be more inclined to associate the political stance with a
source, but not as inclined to associate its influence on others. In the pilot study, a large
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number (i.e., over 60% for each source) of participants were able to identify the
conservative stance for Fox News and the liberal stance for CNN, but fewer participants
identified the sources as having a “high” reach. Using the metrics, such as views and
subscriptions, did not particularly affect perceptions of bias. The lack of source effects
may have contributed to less of a focus on influence of the source, and more of a focus on
the content only. It is plausible that with a larger number of participants associating the
source with the content, the perceptions of its reach would be stronger.
An additional explanation of the lack of effect of news source reach is that
individuals may perceive the smaller or lesser-known sources as more biased. Lowerreach sources and those that do not have as large of an influence would not have to abide
by some of the standards in place in mainstream media. Sources that reach a much
smaller audience may go a bit more unchecked in headlines and content that directly
opposes the other side. An assessment of the overall content being presented on a source
such as Fox News versus PatriotNewsDaily may indicate how deliberate one source
would be over the other in biased presentation of content.
Limitations and Ideas for Future Research
A major limitation of this study is power. There were a large number of
participants who did not correctly identify the source they read and had their data
excluded from analysis, resulting in a sample size that was less than half of what was
intended for 90% power. There were an unequal number of participants in each of the
four conditions (i.e., Low-Reach liberal, High-Reach liberal, Low-Reach conservative,
High-Reach conservative) after data cleaning, which may have compromised the
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comparison of differences between liberals and conservatives across the independent
variables. In future research using a similar methodology, perceptions of bias could be
explored in a different way where attention checks on source are not as crucial to the
outcomes and overall goals of the study. For example, open-ended response items could
be used where individuals could explain why they perceived a source to be bias or
neutral. In this way, researchers could detect whether the recognition of the source truly
impacts perceptions of bias, or rather if the content itself is most important.
An additional limitation to the study is the potential bias in the article content
itself. There were steps taken to ensure the article was as neutral as possible and that it
did not have a slant in either the conservative or liberal direction. Some of these steps
including balancing the arguments made in favor of either side, as well as omitting
information that was a direct indication of bias in either direction. The article chosen for
the study was the modified version of the U.S. Farm Bill article, and this was due to
participants in the pilot study rating it closely to moderate (i.e., M = 3.12 on a 1-5 scale,
1-3 indicating a liberal bias, 3-5 indicating a conservative bias, and 3 indicating neutral or
moderate). Since the ratings were an average of 3.12, a limitation is that the article
content may have been slightly biased in the conservative direction from the start. Future
studies using a similar methodology could ask participants to elaborate further on their
ratings and why they perceived the content as biased in any particular direction. This
way, specific points in the article could be targeted and altered to fit more of a neutral
stance.

53
Another limitation is a nonrepresentative sample of the population. A byproduct
of using Amazon Mechanical Turk is that demographics of participants vary
tremendously, and depending on the samples there may be a very uneven distribution of
white/caucasian, african american, and latinx participants. There is also the limitation of
typically a Liberally-skewed sample in terms of political orientation in Amazon
Mechnical Turk participants (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). This limitation was reflected
in my research, with nearly double the number of Liberal participants as Conservative
participants. Other studies have shown that a recurring limitation to Amazon Mechanical
Turk samples is a lack of participant naiveté (Chandler et al., 2014; Fort et al., 2011). The
generalizability of the results to other populations is compromised, so it will be important
to conduct further research using a different sampling method.
The shift in the dynamics surrounding online news in general presents an
additional limitation to this study. Individuals are consuming a large amount of news
through social media, which often is done through the sharing of embedded links that
may already have comments/critiques on the story (Carlson, 2016). Additionally, people
may be paying more attention to the individual who shares the article rather than the
source (Lee et al., 2018). As a result of the sharing of news by third parties on social
media, there is now a prevalence of mundane media criticism, which may be a phrase or
several sentences provided by the sharer that offer criticism or support towards a news
article. This may cause the consumer to detach the article from the website or news
source itself, compromising their evaluation of the article within its original context
(Carlson, 2016). It is possible that individuals are perceiving news in an entirely different
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way, and less consideration is being given to the news outlet. This provides a limitation
to this study due to the effectiveness of the manipulation depending on perceptions of the
source itself as well as perceptions of its audience. Future research should examine news
sharing in the social media landscape, and how the hostile media effect translates to this
research.
Lastly, there are several limitations to this study related to the timing and
motivations of participants who completed this study. Participants may have been less
motivated to pay attention to the article and the questions due to the low compensation
for completion of the study ($0.50). This lowered motivation may also relate to the lack
of time spent reading the article. The timer set on the article page yielded a wide range of
results in participants’ time spent reading the article itself. It is reasonable to question
how well they were able to decipher bias in the article and any political slant in either
direction, given that some participants spent so little time reading the article. Future
research could offer higher compensation for the study, such as in the $1.00 to $5.00
range for completion. This may lead to more motivated participants and even raise the
time spent reading any articles or other materials during the study, and may also lead to
more thoughtful responses on the questionnaires.
Future research could look at other factors influencing the hostile media effect,
such as the diversity and number of news outlets an individual follows. If they show
allegiance to only one or two outlets, will they perceive more bias in coverage from
outlets they do not follow or outlets that are contrary to the stance of the outlets they
follow? Additionally, future research could further assess the association between
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partisan identity and the hostile media effect by examining whether partisan identity
moderates the relationship between news source and hostile media effect.
Motivated reasoning encompasses different phenomena that govern how people
interact with and the ways people seek out information (Kunda, 1990). Biased
assimilation refers to an individual’s selective interpretation of new or incoming
information (Lord et al., 1979). Since biased assimilation and hostile media bias both
refer to perceptions of incoming information, it is plausible that they may be more closely
related and their relationship should be examined further. Separating or at least
emphasizing certain parts of bias could help determine the root causes and potential ways
to counteract it. Interestingly, asking individuals to consider bias in a news report prior to
reading it helped to counteract overall perceptions of hostile media bias (Litovsky, 2021).
Defining or separating out the types of bias that underlie hostile media perceptions could
aid in understanding of its root causes and where biases lie in the news content people
interact with daily.
Implications
This research contributes to the growing discussion on the hostile media effect in
a digital news society, the partisan divide, and the steps society should take to reduce it.
The key outcome of this study is that individuals perceived bias in the articles they read,
but it was not the source that contributed to these perceptions of bias, or the level of its
reach. The hostile media effect is evident in individual perceptions of news coverage in
general topic areas as well as the political landscape, however, the contributing factors
towards hostile media perceptions need to be explored further. Previous studies have
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detected partisan identity salience as a mediator (For a review, see Kim & Hwang, 2019;
Reid, 2012), however there could be additional factors influencing an individual’s
perceptions of bias.
Another overarching implication of this study is that it reflects a change in
dynamics of news consumption and how perceptions of bias fit into this new context. A
key takeaway from this research is that news sharing has diminished source perceptions,
and it is imperative to investigate how the hostile media effect plays a role in how we
interact with news on social media. With social media offering individuals the
opportunity to offer commentary and present news in a way that fits their beliefs and
cognitive representations, dissecting whether we are receiving accurate news is a fair
question. It is crucial in an increasingly polarizing political climate – where individuals
are more divided on issues than ever before – that individuals are actively seeking out the
most accurate news information and multiple sources to develop their opinions. This
could impact choices at the voting booths and subsequent policies that affect millions of
Americans.
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APPENDIX A
Hostile media effect measures, Quality, and Agreement items (Gunther & Liebhart, 2006;
Gunther et al., 2009), Fact-Based versus Opinion-based item, and Informative item.
Hostile media effect items
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:
I feel the article I just read was biased against a Liberal viewpoint (HME)
1=Strongly Disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=Strongly Agree
I feel the article I just read was biased against a Conservative viewpoint (HME)
1=Strongly Disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=Strongly Agree
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Quality Item
Please rate the quality of the article you just read.
1=Very poor quality
2
3
4
5
6
7=Very high quality
Agreement Item
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the content of the article you read.
1=Strongly Disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=Strongly Agree
Fact-Based versus Opinion-Based item.
On the slider below, please indicate the extent to which you thought the article you read
contained opinion-based information or fact-based information.
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Mostly Opinion-based Mostly Fact-based
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Informative item
Please indicate the extent to which, if any, you agree with the following statement:
The article was informative.
1 = Strongly Disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7 = Strongly Agree
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APPENDIX B
Attention checks and Manipulation check
Attention check items
What was the news source of the article you just read?
1. CNN
2. Fox News
3. PatriotNewsDaily
4. The Progressive
5. NBC News
6. Not Sure
In your own words, please describe what the article was about? (open-ended response
with comment box)

Manipulation check items
Pilot Study Item
About how many views did the article you read have?
1. Less than 1,000
2. 1,000-100,000
3. 100,000-500,000
4. 500,000-1,000,000
5. More than 1,000,000
Primary Study Item
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On a scale of 1-7, with 1 meaning “hardly any people” and 7 meaning “an extremely
large number of people”, indicate the size of the message’s audience. (PR)
1. Hardly any people
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. An extremely large number of people
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APPENDIX C
Partisan Identity Scale (Huddy & Bankert, 2017)
What political party, if any, do you identify most with?
1. Democrat (Liberal)
2. Republican (Conservative)
3. Independent
4. Green Party
5. Libertarian
6. No Affiliation
7. Other (please specify) ________________
When answering the following statements, please think about the political party you
indicated you identify most with…
When I speak about this political party, I usually say “we” instead of “they”
1=strongly disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=strongly agree
When people criticize this party, it feels like a personal insult.
1=strongly disagree
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2
3
4
5
6
7=strongly agree
I have a lot in common with other supporters of this party.
1=strongly disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=strongly agree
When I meet someone who supports this party, I feel connected to this person.
1=strongly disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=strongly agree
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When people praise this party, it makes me feel good.
1=strongly disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=strongly agree
If this party does badly in opinion polls, my day is ruined.
1=strongly disagree
2
3
4
5
6
7=strongly agree
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APPENDIX D
News Source Manipulations

Trump signs Agriculture Improvement Act, Republicans
not ready to drop stricter food stamp regulations
By Todd Alexander, CNN
Updated 5:08 PM ET, February 14, 2019

(CNN) - U.S. lawmakers recently passed the Agriculture Improvement Act, otherwise known as the U.S. 2018
farm bill, in order to establish new funding for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and several other key programs
for the nation’s farmers. Perhaps the most controversial component to the bill, or lack thereof, is the proposed
changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), more commonly known as food stamps.
Republicans exhausted their efforts in lobbying for tighter food stamps criteria but were once again unsuccessful
in doing so. President Trump and others hastily fought for lowering the income criteria below the threshold it sits
at currently and also enacting mandatory strict drug testing of all individuals receiving
s the benefit. If included
in the bill, individuals who failed sdrug tests were to have their benefit stripped form them for a minimum of
1-year and be subjected to rigorous drug counseling.
Democrats had advocated for an increase in food stamp provisions in the bill, wanting the inclusion of items such
as medications and birth control on the list. Unsurprisingly, they were unsuccessful in getting these changes
enacted to the bill. In addition, the Democrats in the House of Representatives came under
e fir for deliberately
stalling the passage of the bill in a time when theafinnci al security of farmers was in the palm of their hands.
While the various agricultural programs were passed under the bill, the food stamp changes were tabled for the
time being and more clarity should come when discussions on a new bill commence halfway through 2020.
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Trump signs Agriculture Improvement Act, Republicans
not ready to drop stricter food stamp regulations
Dec. 20, 2018, 5:06 p.m.

By Todd Alexander

U

.S. lawmakers recently passed the Agriculture Improvement Act, otherwise known as the U.S. 2018
farm bill, in order to establish new funding for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and several other key
programs for the nation’s farmers. Perhaps the most controversial component to the bill, or lack thereof, is
the proposed changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), more commonly known as
food stamps. Republicans exhausted theirr effots in lobbying for tighter food stamps criteria but were once
again unsuccessful in doing so. President Trump and others hastily fought for lowering the income criteria
below the threshold it sits at currently and also enacting mandatory strict drug testing of all individuals
receiving
s the benefit. If included in the bill, individuals who failed sdrug tests were to have their benefit
stripped form them for a minimum of 1-year and be subjected to rigorous drug counseling.
Democrats had advocated for an increase in food stamp provisions in the bill, wanting the inclusion of items
such as medications and birth control on the list. Unsurprisingly, they were unsuccessful in getting these
changes enacted to the bill. In addition, the Democrats in the House of Representatives came under
e fir for
deliberately stalling the passage of the bill in a time when theafinnci al security of farmers was in the palm
of their hands. While the various agricultural programs were passed under the bill, the food stamp changes
were tabled for the time being and more clarity should come when discussions on a new bill commence
halfway through 2020.
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High-reach Conservative

President Trump signs 2018 farm bill, despite
intentional Democratic stalling

U.S. lawmakers recently passed the Agriculture Improvement Act, otherwise known as the U.S. 2018
farm bill, in order to establish new funding for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and several other key
programs for the nation’s farmers. Perhaps the most controversial component to the bill, or lack thereof,
is the proposed changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), more commonly
known as food stamps. Republicans exhausted their efforts in lobbying for tighter food stamps criteria
but were once again unsuccessful in doing so. President Trump and others hastily fought for lowering the
income criteria below the threshold it sits at currently and also enacting mandatory strict drug testing of
all individuals receiving
s the benefit. If included in the bill, individuals swho failed drug tests were to have
their benefit st ripped for m them for a mi ni m
u m of 1- year and be subj ect ed to rigor ous dr ug counsel ing.
Democrats had advocated for an increase in food stamp provisions in the bill, wanting the inclusion of
items such as medications and birth control on the list. Unsurprisingly, they were unsuccessful in getting
these changes enacted to the bill. In addition, the Democrats in the House of Representatives came
under
e fir for deliberately stalling the passage of the bill in a time when theafinnci al security of farmers
was in the palm of their hands. While the various agricultural programs were passed under the bill, the
food stamp changes were tabled for the time being and more clarity should come when discussions on a
new bill commence halfway through 2020.
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APPENDIX E
Original news article text with changes/edits highlighted
*underlined text = paraphrased and/or edited to balance arguments in study article*
*strikethrough text = omitted from study article*
Original Article source: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-farmbill/senate-approvesfarm-bill-compromise-that-avoids-food-stamp-cuts-idUSKBN1OA0BY
Original Article:
U.S. lawmakers have reached an agreement on a farm bill that leaves out a
proposal to tighten food stamps criteria backed by President Donald Trump, and offers
some financial certainty to farmers suffering from the U.S. trade war with China.
The bill passed the Senate 87-13. Congressional staffers are expecting the House
to vote by Thursday and send the bill to Trump for his signature before Friday.
The agreement between Republicans and Democrats on the crucial piece of
legislation caps a bitter, months-long debate on the bill, which covers $867 billion worth
of food and agriculture programs including crop subsidies and support to growers seeking
access to export markets.
The final text shows Republicans in the lame duck Congress had to walk back
from some of their demands, the biggest being the proposal, championed by Trump, to
impose stricter requirements for recipients of food stamps.
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Speaking to reporters at the White House, Trump, who had accused the
Democrats of stalling the bill, said the progress on it was bipartisan. “We think the farm
bill is in very good shape. A lot of good things are happening with it, and out farmers are
well taken care of,” he said.
The debate had delayed the legislation beyond the most recent version’s
expiration in September, and was finalized only after Democrats won a majority in the
House of Representatives in elections in November.
Food stamps, or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, is a vouchertype free food program used by more than 40 million Americans, or about 12 percent of
the total U.S. population.

81
APPENDIX F
Debriefing
There was a debriefing message for the primary study discussing the true focus
and goals of the study incorporated into the “End of Survey” message. The debriefing
message was as follows:
“Thank you for participating in this study!
While the article you read was based on a real piece of U.S. legislation, the article was
created for this study and contained some false information. The article was also not
distributed from the source you read it from in the study. We didn’t tell you that to start
with because we wanted to see how you would respond to an article that you believed
was printed in a particular news source. We are interested in whether people’s political
beliefs affect their interpretations of news from the mass media, as well as whether or not
the perceptions of the size of the news source’s influence will impact those
interpretations. Please do not discuss the details of this study with any other individuals
that could participate – this is very important for the accuracy of the study.
If you have further questions about this study, please contact either Matthew Sedlacek at
sedlamab@uni.edu or Helen Harton at helen.harton@uni.edu.
Thank you for your time and effort!”

82
APPENDIX G
Demographic questions and honesty check
What is your age? (dropdown list 18-99)
What is your gender?
What is your education level?
1. 8th grade or lower

4. Bachelor’s Degree

2. High School diploma or GED

5. Graduate Degree

3. Associate’s Degree
What is your race/ethnicity? Select all that apply.
1. Asian/Pacific Islander
2. Black/African American
3. Hispanic/Latinx
4. Multiracial
5. Native American/American Indian
6. White/Caucasian
7. Not listed (please specify _________)
How honest were you in answering the questions on this survey? You will receive
compensation regardless of your answer.
1. Not at all honest
2. Slightly honest
3. Somewhat honest
4. Very honest
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APPENDIX H
Results without exclusion of cases for mis-identification of source

Table 7
Re-run of Article Bias Ratings Against a Conservative Viewpoint Depending on Source
Political Orientation
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
6
2.809
1.587
.150
Intercept
1
105.469 59.588
<.001*
SourcePO
2
1.510
.853
.427
PartPO
2
5.526
3.122
.045*
SourcePO*PartPO
2
1.320
.746
.475
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.027
.148
.005
.018
.004

Table 8
Re-run of Article Bias Ratings Against a Liberal Viewpoint Depending on Source
Political Orientation
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
6
8.821
3.739
.001*
Intercept
1
118.254 50.129
<.001*
SourcePO
2
5.022
2.129
.121
PartPO
2
11.092
4.702
.010*
SourcePO*PartPO
2
.628
.266
.766
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.061
.128
.012
.027
.002
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Table 9
Re-run of Article Quality Ratings Depending on Source Political Orientation
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
6
2.253
1.821
.094
Intercept
1
409.914 317.276 <.001*
SourcePO
2
1.990
1.540
.216
PartPO
2
2.627
2.034
.132
SourcePO*PartPO
2
3.428
2.653
.072
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.031
.481
.009
.012
.015

Table 10
Re-run of Ratings of Agreement with Article Content Depending on Source Political
Orientation
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
6
3.331
2.353
.031*
Intercept
1
386.059 272.688 <.001*
SourcePO
2
1.572
1.111
.331
PartPO
2
7.224
5.103
.007*
SourcePO*PartPO
2
1.118
.790
.455
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.040
.443
.006
.029
.005
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Table 11
Re-run of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Article Bias Ratings Against a Conservative Viewpoint
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
12
2.818
1.609
.087
Intercept
1
137.897 78.746
<.001*
SourcePO
1
1.273
.727
.394
SourceReach
1
6.336
3.618
.058
PartPO
2
6.692
3.822
.023*
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
5.432
3.102
.079
SourcePO*PartPO
2
2.041
1.165
.313
SourceReach*PartPO
2
1.882
1.074
.343
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 2
4.333
2.474
.086
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.054
.189
.002
.011
.022
.009
.007
.006
.015

Table 12
Re-run of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Article Bias Ratings Against a Liberal Viewpoint
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
12
5.212
2.197
.012*
Intercept
1
146.203 61.626
<.001*
SourcePO
1
1.595
.672
.413
SourceReach
1
.027
.011
.915
PartPO
2
10.293
4.339
.014*
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
.730
.308
.579
SourcePO*PartPO
2
.899
.379
.685
SourceReach*PartPO
2
1.828
.771
.464
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 2
.027
.011
.989
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.073
.155
.002
.000
.025
.001
.002
.005
.000
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Table 13
Re-run of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Article Quality Ratings
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
12
1.797
1.390
.168
Intercept
1
474.496 367.008 <.001*
SourcePO
1
1.819
1.407
.236
SourceReach
1
.009
.007
.932
PartPO
2
3.271
2.530
.081
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
2.008
1.553
.214
SourcePO*PartPO
2
3.879
3.000
.051
SourceReach*PartPO
2
1.275
.986
.374
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 2
2.014
1.558
.212
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.047
.521
.004
.000
.015
.005
.018
.006
.009

Table 14
Re-run of Moderation of News Source Reach on Relationship Between Source PO,
Participant PO, and Ratings of Agreement
Source

df

Mean
F
p-value
Square
Corrected Model
12
2.559
1.816
.044*
Intercept
1
432.799 307.138 <.001*
SourcePO
1
.220
.156
.693
SourceReach
1
.769
.546
.461
PartPO
2
6.957
4.937
.008*
SourcePO*Source Reach
1
.118
.083
.773
SourcePO*PartPO
2
1.152
.818
.442
SourceReach*PartPO
2
1.183
.839
.433
SourcePO*SourceReach*PartPO 2
1.761
1.250
.288
*
Note: = correlation is significant at the .05 level. PO = political orientation.

partial

2

.061
.477
.001
.002
.029
.000
.005
.005
.007

